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Toward Adoption of State Law as the Federal Rule
of Decision in Cases Involving Voluntary
Federal Creditors
Mortgage foreclosures by voluntary federal creditors, such
as the Small Business Administration (SBA), Federal Housing
Authority (FHA),1 or Farmers Home Administration (FmHA),2
create a unique legal problem. State mortgage law potentially
affects the implementation of these federal programs to such
an extent that federal courts have held that federal law
preempts the state law.3 Application of federal law, however, is
1. The Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) cur-
rently administers FHA. References to the FHA or HUD are to the programs
HUD administers under the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1750
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986). This Note refers to the FHA and HUD synonymously.
2. This Note refers to federal entities such as the Small Business Admin-
istration, Federal Housing Authority, and Farmers' Home Administration as
voluntary federal creditors. The phrase emphasizes the distinction between
federal creditor/debtor relationships resulting from "voluntarily" undertaken
social welfare programs, and federal creditor/debtor relationships resulting
from governmental necessity in tax collection. See United States v. Kimbell
Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 734-36 (1979) (distinguishing the federal agencies as
voluntary and involuntary creditors).
3. The Supreme Court has held that federal law, rather than state law,
governs the rights of voluntary federal creditors because the agencies are per-
forming a "constitutional function." I& at 726 (citing Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366 (1943)). See also United States v. View Crest
Garden Apartments, Inc., 268 F.2d 380, 382 (9th Cir.) (applying federal law in
FHA foreclosure), cert denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959).
The interaction between state and federal law is a spectrum. On one end
state law applies by its own force and on the other end the supremacy clause
of the United States Constitution preempts state law. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
Along the spectrum the potential for state law to interfere with the implemen-
tation of federal statutory schemes increases. The greater the potential of a
state law to affect a federal program's operation, the greater is the chance that
a court will deem the state law preempted and will require application of fed-
eral law. Mishkin, The Variousness of "Federal Law": Competence and Dis-
cretion in the Choice of National and State Rules for Decision, 105 U. PA. L.
REV 797, 805 (1957). See Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal
Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 383, 408-12 (1964) (examining consequences
of Clearfteld Trust). See generally Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARv.
L. REV. 1512, 1526-31 (1969) (viewing overriding of presumed application of
state law as justified to protect federal policies); Note, The Competence of Fed-
eral Courts to Formulate Rules of Decision, 77 HARV. L. REV. 1084, 1089-94
(1964) (discussing role of federal judiciary in creating federal law).
The problem with foreclosures by voluntary federal creditors is that
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complicated because Congress, in enacting these programs, did
not promulgate federal foreclosure procedures to replace the
preempted state law.4 In the absence of a "congressional direc-
tive,"5 the federal courts must determine a federal rule of deci-
sion6 to apply in foreclosures by voluntary federal creditors.7
The content of the federal rule of decision may incorporate ap-
plicable state law or the courts may choose to disregard state
law and formulate their own rule.8 In choosing between these
two alternatives, courts have been unable to establish guide-
courts have determined that state mortgage law is preempted with reference
to federal social welfare programs but Congress has not filled the gap with
federal mortgage legislation. Thus, courts have been forced either to create
their own rules or to adopt state law as the federal law.
4. An attempt to pass a Federal Mortgage Foreclosure Act failed in 1973.
S. 2507, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 119 CONG. REc. 32, 175-76, §§ 401-419 (1973). In
1981, Congress did pass the the Multifamily Mortgage Foreclosure Act
(MMFA), Pub L. No. 97-35, 95 Stat. 431 (1981) (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 3701-
3717 (1982)). The MMFA provides nonjudicial foreclosure procedures for
HUD foreclosures of multifamily project mortgages under Section 207 of the
National Housing Act.
5. Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 740. Where Congress has not expressly pre-
empted state law, the courts have considered whether Congress intended them
to apply state law as the federal rule of decision. See View Crest, 268 F.2d at
381-82 (finding no congressional intent in FHA legislation that courts should
apply state receivership law); Fidelity Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. De La Cuesta,
458 U.S. 141, 160-64, 171-72 (1982) (finding congressional intent that Federal
Home Loan Bank Board exclusively regulate savings and loans).
The law is unsettled as to whether courts may rely on regulations as ex-
pressions of congressional intent. In United States v. Missouri Farmers Ass'n,
764 F.2d 488, 489-90 (8th Cir. 1985) (per curiam), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1053
(1986), the court held that FmHA regulations implied that state laws gov-
erning waiver of security interests were contrary to FmHA interests. Justice
White dissented from the Supreme Court's decision to deny certiorari because
he thought Missouri Farmers was contrary to the Court's holding in Kimbell,
discussed infra notes 48-63 and accompanying text, because it was improper to
infer a congressional directive from regulations. Missouri Farmers Ass'n v.
United States, 106 S. Ct. 1281, 1282 (1986) (White, J., dissenting), denying cert
to United States v. Missouri Farmers Ass'n, 764 F.2d 488 (8th Cir. 1985). But
see United States v. Great Plains Gasification Assocs., 813 F.2d 193, 195-96 (8th
Cir.) (holding that Department of Energy regulations impliedly preempted
state redemption laws), cert denied, 108 S. Ct. 285 (1987).
6. The phrase federal rule of decision refers to the federal common law
rule that governs in the absence of a statute or implied congressional directive.
See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 366-67 (1943). The
phrase also is used as a reference to the criteria that courts apply in formulat-
ing the common law rule.
7. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 740 (1979); Chicago
Title Ins. Co. v. Sherred Village Assocs., 708 F.2d 804, 807 (1st Cir. 1983);
United States v. View Crest Garden Apartments, Inc., 268 F.2d 380, 382 (9th
Cir.), cert denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959).
8. Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 367.
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lines that allow them consistently to determine when adoption
of state law is appropriate in foreclosures by voluntary federal
creditors.
Historically, the federal courts have fashioned rules of deci-
sion to protect federal entities against loss, adopting state mort-
gage procedures but rejecting state debtor protections.9 Thus,
courts have adopted and rejected state mortgage law in a piece-
meal fashion. For example, courts in some circuits have held
that a federal agency may take advantage of state procedures
providing for extrajudicial sale, but also have held that nothing
prevents the agency from obtaining a deficiency judgment 0
contrary to state law.1 ' Other decisions have held that a fed-
eral agency may bring a suit for deficiency at its leisure,
although the state law requires filing of the claim within a spe-
cific period following the foreclosure sale.'2 As a final example,
some courts have held that federal creditors are immune from
state redemption laws,' 3 even though a statute forbids the
9. See infra notes 28-47 and accompanying text.
10. If the price paid for foreclosed property is insufficient to pay the en-
tire debt secured by the mortgage, in some cases the creditor may seek a defi-
ciency judgment against the borrower for the balance of the debt. State
deficiency laws regulate the procedure for obtaining such judgments. Such
laws may require notice of intent to pursue a deficiency, place time limits on
the pursuit of a deficiency, or limit the amount of a deficiency. See NELSON &
WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW §§ 8.1-.3 (2d ed. 1985). Some states pro-
hibit creditors from pursuing a deficiency judgment except at the time of the
filing of the original foreclosure. Id; see generally Comment, The Role of State
Deficiency Judgment Law in FHA Insured Mortgage Transactions, 56 MINN.
L. REv. 463, 465-66 (1972) (discussing various state deficiency judgment
provisions).
11. United States v. Gish, 559 F.2d 572, 575 (9th Cir. 1977) (preempting
state anti-deficiency statute by SBA regulation), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 996
(1978). See also United States v. Haddon Haciendas Co., 541 F.2d 777, 783-85
(9th Cir. 1976) (rejecting adoption of state interpretation of deficiency statute
that barred suit for waste).
12. United States v. Merrick Sponsor Corp., 421 F.2d 1076, 1078-79 (2d Cir.
1970) (holding FHA need not abide by requirement that motion for deficiency
be filed 90 days after delivery of deed).
13. Redemption statutes generally provide the debtor with a period of
time, ranging from six months to two years, in which to repurchase the fore-
closed land from the buyer after foreclosure by paying the foreclosure price
plus interest. Many states allow the debtor to remain in possession of the land
during the redemption period. The statutes are designed to encourage the
buyer at foreclosure to bid the market price for the property because failure to
do so will give the debtor incentive to redeem. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra
note 10, §§ 8.4-.8.
States have developed a variety of detailed statutory schemes to govern
the relationship between mortgagor and mortgagee. States protect debtors
from below market value bids at foreclosure in several ways other than defi-
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agency to bid more than the amount of the federal debt, even if
that amount is less than the property's fair market value.14
Such judicial protection of federal agencies intrudes into an
area traditionally governed by the states, disregards states' in-
terests in protecting their citizens from unfair bargaining posi-
tions, and impairs states' ability to govern their own economies.
Moreover, the piecemeal nature of judicial usurpation of state
law creates uncertainty in commercial transactions and in-
volves a balancing of interests better suited to treatment by
Congress.
In 1979 the Supreme Court, in United States v. Kimbell
Foods, Inc.,15 ostensibly attempted to change the pattern of as-
suring federal creditors against loss.16 The Court in Kimbell re-
jected the "choateness doctrine," a federal rule of decision
giving federal non-tax liens preferential treatment over private
liens in the determination of their priority.'7 In doing so, the
Court applied criteria greatly expanding the opportunity to
adopt state law as the federal rule of decision in cases involving
voluntary federal creditors such as the SBA and FmHA.'8
Federal courts have not applied the Kimbell test consist-
ently in the context of state redemption and deficiency stat-
ciency and redemption statutes. Some states protect debtors from bids below
fair market value at foreclosure by giving the judiciary the power to determine
the property's fair market value and to refuse to confirm a foreclosure sale
where the price obtained was less than two-thirds of the court's determination.
Some states also discourage low bidding at foreclosure by limiting the defi-
ciency amount available to the mortgagee after foreclosure to the difference
between a judicially-determined fair market price (rather than the actual price
paid at foreclosure) and the amount of the debt. Many states also have chosen
to regulate when and how a creditor obtains deficiency judgments. States also
have accommodated mortgagees by providing for extrajudicial sale, thus re-
lieving mortgagees of the burden of judicially supervised foreclosure, but usu-
ally at the cost of the mortgagee's right to pursue a deficiency. See NELSON &
WHITMAN, supra note 10, §§ 8.1-.3.
14. The FHA can bid only up to the loan amount outstanding, even if it is
less than the fair market value. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1713(k), 1743(f) (1982 & Supp.
IV 1986).
15. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
16. The Court in Kimbell addressed the issue of choosing federal rules of
decision in voluntary creditor cases, but did not address directly the redemp-
tion or deficiency cases. Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 727-41.
17. The choateness doctrine at issue in Kimbell granted federal liens pri-
ority over private liens that were not certain as to person, property, and
amount, which for all practical purposes required the private lien be taken to
judgment before it could obtain priority even over a subsequent federal lien.
Id at 721 n.8 (discussing the history of the choateness doctrine).
18. I& at 727-30.
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utes 19 In pre-Kimbell cases, courts generally refused to adopt
state laws limiting the remedies of the United States (acting as
the FHA, SBA, or FmHA) in mortgage foreclosure proceed-
ings.20 These courts emphasized the need to protect the federal
treasury, which they viewed as a measurement of the volume of
social services the agencies could provide.21
The Court in Kimbell, by contrast, disavowed the argument
that social welfare programs have an overriding interest in col-
19. Although there is no direct conflict among the circuits, courts clearly
have adopted different interpretations of the Kimbell case. For instance, the
Fifth Circuit held that Kimbell instructed the courts to treat federal agencies
as though they were private lenders in their commercial relations in cases in-
volving the SBA. See United States v. Irby, 618 F.2d 352, 355 (5th Cir. 1980)
(adopting state law to determine reasonableness of SBA foreclosure sale);
United States v. Dismuke, 616 F.2d 755, 759 (5th Cir. 1980) (adopting state defi-
ciency law in SBA foreclosure sale); infra notes 73-77 and accompanying text
(discussing Fifth Circuit decisions). Conversely, the Eighth Circuit has shown
great reluctance to adopt state law whenever the state law inconveniences a
federal agency. See United States v. Landmark Park & Assocs., 795 F.2d 683,
684-87 (8th Cir. 1986) (refusing to adopt state law to determine perfection of
HUD interests in rents and profits); United States v. Victory Highway Village,
Inc., 662 F.2d 488, 497-98 (8th Cir. 1981) (refusing to adopt state redemption
law in HUD case); infra notes 86-90 and accompanying text (discussing Eighth
Circuit decisions).
The conflict over adoption of state redemption laws in FmHA foreclosures
illustrates the different interpretations of Kimbell. While a Ninth Circuit de-
cision has adopted state redemption law in an FmHA foreclosure, a federal
district court in Kansas, a state within the Tenth Circuit, has rejected such
adoption. See infra note 90 (discussing difference between New Mexico and
Kansas redemption statutes). Compare United States v. Ellis, 714 F.2d 953 (9th
Cir. 1983) (adopting state redemption law in FmHA forclosure) with United
States v. Curry, 561 F. Supp. 429 (D. Kan. 1983) (rejecting adopting of state re-
demption law in FmiHA foreclosure).
20. See infra notes 28-47 and accompanying text.
21. See United States v. Stadium Apartments, Inc., 425 F.2d 358, 360-67
(9th Cir.) (refusing to adopt state redemption law in FHA foreclosure), cert
denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970); United States v. Chester Park Apartments, Inc.,
332 F.2d 1, 3-5 (8th Cir.) (refusing to adopt state receivership law in FHA fore-
closure), cert denied, 379 U.S. 901 (1964); United States v. View Crest Garden
Apartments, Inc., 268 F.2d 380, 382-84 (9th Cir.) (refusing to adopt state receiv-
ership law in FHA foreclosure), cert denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959); United States
v. Montgomery, 268 F. Supp. 787, 790 (D. Kan. 1967) (refusing to adopt state
redemption law in SBA foreclosure). But see United States v. MacKenzie, 510
F.2d 39, 41-43 (9th Cir. 1975) (adopting state deficiency law in SBA foreclo-
sure); Calvert Assocs. v. Harris, 469 F. Supp. 922, 926-27 (E.D. Mich. 1979)
(adopting state redemption law in HUD foreclosure by advertisement); United
States v. Johansson, 467 F. Supp. 84, 85-86 (D. Me. 1979) (adopting state re-
demption law in FmHA foreclosure); United States v. Marshall, 431 F. Supp.
888, 891-92 (N.D. Ill. 1977) (adopting state redemption law in SBA foreclosure).
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lecting revenue.22 Voluntary federal creditors, the Court indi-
cated, should be treated as private businesses are treated when
undertaking commercial transactions unless state law inter-
feres with the actual operation of the program.23
In post-Kimbell cases, some courts adopted state law, focus-
ing on the agencies' ability to operate within state law and still
achieve federal social welfare objectives.24 Other courts have
continued to reject state law, however, relying primarily on the
need to protect the monetary interests of the federal programs,
especially in cases involving mortgages insured under the Na-
tional Housing Act.25
This Note analyzes the criteria for selecting federal rules of
decision in voluntary federal creditor cases under the Kimbell
test. Part I considers the pre-Kimbell protection of federal in-
terests, examines the Kimbell decision, and considers its subse-
quent application. Part II analyzes the factors post-Kimbell
courts have considered in rejecting or adopting state redemp-
tion and deficiency laws. Part III concludes that courts should
adopt state mortgage law as the federal rule of decision in vol-
untary creditor cases, unless the federal agency demonstrates
that adoption would substantially reduce the agency's ability to
accomplish its social welfare objectives.
I. KIMBELL AS A WATERSHED IN CHOOSING
FEDERAL RULES OF DECISION IN
VOLUNTARY FEDERAL CREDITOR
CASES
In an effort to implement federal policy and to protect the
federal treasury, pre-Kimbell courts tended to fashion their
own rules of decision rather than to adopt state law in cases in-
volving foreclosures by voluntary federal creditors.26 The
Supreme Court in Kimbell established new criteria intended to
curb unnecessary protection of federal interests at the expense
of private expectations based on state law.2 7 The tenacity of
the pre-Kimbell precedents, however, has caused divergent ap-
plications of the Kimbell criteria.
22. Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 734-36; see infra notes 56-59 and accompanying
text.
23. Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 738; see infra notes 56-59 and 73-77 and accompa-
nying text.
24. See infra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 78-90 and accompanying text.
26. See infra notes 28-47.
27. See infra notes 48-63 and accompanying text.
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A. REJECTION OF STATE MORTGAGE LAW AS THE FEDERAL
RULE OF DECISION IN PRE-K!MBELL CASES
In determining whether or not to adopt state receivership
law in an FHA foreclosure, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit, in the seminal case United States v. View
Crest Garden Apartments, Inc.,2s asserted that a uniform fed-
eral rule was necessary to further federal policy.29 The court
rejected adoption of state law in favor of
the federal policy to protect the treasury and to promote the security
of federal investment which in turn promotes the prime purpose of
the Act-to facilitate the building of homes by the use of federal
credit.... [Thus] local rules limiting the effectiveness of the remedies
available to the United States for breach of a federal duty can not [sic]
be adopted.3 0
In abrogating state receivership law, the court in View Crest be-
lieved that its decision would not necessarily affect more impor-
tant state debtor protections such as the right of redemption,
because balancing state and federal interests would still allow
the adoption of important state debtor protections.31
Courts in subsequent cases followed the reasoning in View
Crest unquestioningly. 32 Emphasizing the need to protect the
28. 268 F.2d 380 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959).
29. In View Crest, the Federal Housing Authority (FHA) requested the
appointment of a receiver to collect rents and to maintain the property prior
to foreclosure. Id. at 381. State law protected the mortgagor by requiring the
mortgagee to show either insufficient security in the property or "waste" by
the mortgagor before a receiver could be appointed. In finding that state law
did not apply, the court noted that federal law governed the rights of federal
agencies and that state law could apply only by virtue of congressional intent
or adoption by a federal court. Id. at 382. The court found no congressional
intent to incorporate state receivership laws under the National Housing Act
and declined to adopt the state receivership law because it did not further fed-
eral policy. Id. at 382-83.
30. Id. at 383.
31. Id. The court stated that "if the considerations weighed by the court
suggest an adoption of local law, such as the local rule on redemption, that
could be done." Id (citing Mishkin, supra note 3).
The View Crest court did not weigh the local interests in regulating the
use of receivers, but remanded the case to the trial court to determine
whether the facts warranted the appointment of a receiver as a matter of fed-
eral law. Id. at 384.
32. See United States v. Stadium Apartments, Inc., 425 F.2d 358, 360-67
(9th Cir.) (refusing to adopt state redemption law in FHA foreclosure), cert
denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970); Clark Inv. Co. v. United States, 364 F.2d 7, 9-10
(9th Cir. 1966) (rejecting adoption of state law deducting rents collected by re-
ceiver from redemption price); United States v. Chester Park Apartments,
Inc., 332 F.2d 1, 3-5 (8th Cir.) (refusing to adopt state receivership law in FHA
foreclosure), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 901 (1964); United States v. Montgomery,
1988]
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federal treasury from the vagaries of state law, federal courts
continued to reject adoption of state law as the federal rule of
decision.33 In the influential case of United States v. Stadium
Apartments, Inc.,3 the Ninth Circuit balanced the state right of
redemption against federal interests, as contemplated in View
Crest,35 and held, contrary to state law, that the FHA 36 may ob-
tain a waiver s7 of the mortgagor's statutory right of redemp-
tion.38 The Stadium court followed the policy that, in dealing
with the government's foreclosure remedies, federal law must
"assure the protection of the federal program against loss, state
law to the contrary notwithstanding."39 The Stadium court
268 F. Supp. 787, 790 (D. Kan. 1967) (refusing to adopt state redemption law in
SBA foreclosure).
33. The lower federal courts continued to follow View Crest despite a
Supreme Court decision in which the Court adopted state law in a case involv-
ing the collection of an SBA loan. The Supreme Court in United States v.
Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966), emphasized the need to balance carefully state and
federal interests in choosing a federal rule of decision. In Yazell, the Court
adopted as federal law the Texas rule of coverture barring wives from binding
their separate property without first obtaining a court dec 'ee, which prevented
the United States from recovering a deficiency judgment on an SBA Disaster
Loan. I&L at 343. In balancing the federal and state interests, the Court found
there was no federal interest in uniformity because "SBA transactions in each
State are specifically and in great detail adapted to state law." Id at 357. In
adopting state law, the Court emphasized "solicitude for state interests" in the
family-property area and noted that state policies "should be overridden by
the federal courts only where clear and substantial interests of the National
Government, which cannot be served consistently with respect for siuch state
interests, will suffer major damage if state law is applied." Id at 352.
The Court worded the issue in Yazell very narrowly and distinguished its
decision from View Crest in a footnote on the basis of the individualized nego-
tiation of the SBA loan. Id at 348. Consequently, Yazell was deemed in later
decisions to be limited to its facts. See infra note 44.
34. 425 F.2d 358 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970).
35. See supra note 31.
36. Stadium involved Title VI of the National Housing Act, which is
designed to assist veterans in obtaining housing. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1736-1746(a)
(1982). The Act operated, in this case, by insuring a loan from a private lender
to a developer who qualified under § 1743(b) of the Act. The Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development imposed regulations upon the mortgagor
and the mortgaged property. Stadium, 425 F.2d at 359.
37. The mortgage in Stadium provided that "[t]he Mortgagor, to the ex-
tent permitted by law, hereby waives the benefit of any and all homestead and
exemption laws and of any right to a stay or redemption and the benefit of any
moratorium law or laws." Stadium, 425 F.2d at 359. The court held that the
phrase "to the extent permitted by law" referred to federal law, even though
federal law does not provide the protections to waive in the first place. Id. at
362.
38. Id at 362.
39. Id, The Stadium court did not acknowledge the standard, asserted in
Yazell, that state policies "should be overridden by the federal courts only
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stressed that post-foreclosure sale redemption periods increased
administrative costs by causing the United States to hold prop-
erty more frequently and for longer periods of time. According
to the court, state redemption laws exposed the government to
increased maintenance, tax, and insurance costs which, in many
states, were not recouped if the property was redeemed.40 The
court was not convinced by the argument that redemption stat-
utes served a state interest by encouraging foreclosure sale bids
closer to market price.41 Indeed, the court asserted that the re-
demption laws in many states obstructed dominion over fore-
where clear and substantial interests of the National Government, which can-
not be served consistently with respect for such state interests, will suffer ma-
jor damage if state law is applied." United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352
(1966).
40. Stadium, 425 F.2d at 365. The court adopted the theory that post-fore-
closure redemption periods lowered bids at foreclosure, thus inducing the
United States to buy the property more frequently to cover the debt. Id. The
court also accepted the assumption that the property tended to depreciate in
value during the redemption period and that because repair costs were not ad-
ded to the redemption price in most states, a mortgagor might be enriched at
the United States's expense. Id.
41. The court noted that rights of redemption did not accompany the use
of trust deeds which had become the dominant form of securing property
loans in many states. The court also stated that there was "no evidence that
second mortgagees or contractors are less willing to extend credit on the se-
curity of junior liens in the states that have no redemption statutes than they
are in the states that do." Stadium, 425 F.2d at 366. The majority, citing Book
2, Volume VII, Sec. 72926 of the FHA Manual, was assured that the FHA had
a policy of bidding market price (although it is not authorized to bid an
amount in excess of its debt under 12 U.S.C. § 1713(k)). Stadium, 425 F.2d at
366. In addition, the majority asserted that the junior lienors could protect
themselves by bidding at the foreclosure sale. Id.
The dissent in Stadium contended that the majority misconstrued the
purpose of redemption statutes. Id. at 367-72. The dissent noted that, histori-
cally, redemption statutes were adopted precisely because third parties rarely
bid at foreclosure sales. Id. at 368. Junior lien holders rarely had enough cash
to purchase property in which they had an interest, and only the first mort-
gage holder could purchase the property on the credit of the debt owed. Id.
Redemption periods encouraged mortgagees to pay market price to remove the
incentive to redeem (if the price paid was the amount of the debt owed and
was considered by the mortgagor to be more valuable than the debt owed the
mortgagee, then the mortgagor would feel robbed of its equity in the property
and would profit from redemption). Id. at 368-69. The dissent also noted that
redemption favored junior lienors, who may also redeem, by inducing a fore-
closure price greater than the first mortgagee's debt. Id. The dissent argued
that redemption statutes protect contractors and suppliers as well as mortga-
gors, and thus asserted that the majority's holding would discourage use of the
federal program. Id. at 367-73. The dissent noted that the FIHA's inability to
bid higher than the amount of its outstanding debt at foreclosure aggravated
the situation. Id. at 370.
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closed property and actually lowered bids.42 In addition, the
court noted that a uniform federal rule was necessary because
state redemption laws varied significantly.43
Stadium reinforced View Crest's rejection of local rules
that limit the effectiveness of federal remedies.44 Courts have
followed the reasoning and conclusions of the court in Stadium
almost without exception in FHA foreclosures under the Na-
tional Housing Act,45 and some courts have adopted the reason-
ing in cases involving SBA and FmHA foreclosures as well.46
Lower federal courts have continued to adhere to Stadium de-
spite Kimbell's rejection of the notion that federal programs
must be "assured" against loss.47
42. Id. at 365-66. The court found that in California, the purchaser at
foreclosure could not obtain possession until the end of the redemption period.
I& at 366.
43. Id. at 364.
44. The Stadium court distinguished Yazell, in which the Supreme Court
had adopted state law that limited the SBA's remedy, on the ground that,
although the FHA form was tailored to the state, the form was not individu-
ally negotiated. Id. at 363. The court also distinguished Bumb v. United
States, 276 F.2d 729 (9th Cir. 1960), which held that the SBA must conform to
state "bulk sales" laws on the basis that the law dealt with the acquisition of
an interest rather than a remedy. Stadium, 425 F.2d at 363-64.
45. See United States v. Landmark Park & Assocs., 795 F.2d 683, 685-88
(8th Cir. 1986) (rejecting state law determining perfection of interest in rents
and profits in FHA foreclosure); United States v. Victory Highway Village,
Inc., 662 F.2d 488, 497-98 (8th Cir. 1981) (rejecting state redemption law in
FHA foreclosure); United States v. Scholnick, 606 F.2d 160, 164-65 (6th Cir.
1979) (rejecting state redemption law in FHA foreclosure). But see Chicago Ti-
tle Ins. Co. v. Sherred Village Assocs., 708 F.2d 804, 807-13 (1st Cir. 1983)
(adopting state mechanic's lien law to determine priority over FHA lien); Cal-
vert Assocs. v. Harris, 469 F. Supp. 922, 926-27 (E.D. Mich. 1979) (adopting
state foreclosure-by-advertisement procedures in FHA foreclosure).
46. See United States v. Missouri Farmers Ass'n, 764 F.2d 488, 489-90 (8th
Cir. 1985) (per curiam) (alternatively rejecting state law concerning waiver of
security interests in FmHA case), cert. denied, 458 U.S. 1053 (1986); United
States v. Elverud, 640 F. Supp. 692, 695-96 (D.N.D. 1986) (rejecting state re-
demption law in FmHA foreclosure); United States v. Larson, 632 F. Supp.
1565, 1568-69 (D.N.D. 1986) (rejecting state deficiency law in SBA foreclosure);
United States v. Curry, 561 F. Supp. 429, 430-31 (D. Kan. 1983) (rejecting state
law prohibiting waiver of redemption rights in FmHA foreclosure); Ricks v.
United States, 434 F. Supp. 1262, 1265-69 (S.D. Ga. 1976) (rejecting state defi-
ciency law in SBA foreclosure).
47. The Supreme Court in Kimbell indicated that voluntary federal credi-
tors generally should be treated as private parties. The Court also stated that
"significant differences between federal tax liens and consensual liens counsel
against unreflective extension of rules that immunize the United States from
the commercial law governing all other voluntary secured creditors." Kimbell,
440 U.S. at 733-38. See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text (discussing
treatment of voluntary federal creditors).
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B. FEDERAL OBJECTIVES AND THE TEST IN UNITED STATES V.
KIMBELL FOODS, INC
The Supreme Court in United States v. Kimbell Foods,
Inc.48 attempted to clarify and redefine the criteria for selecting
state law as the federal rule of decision in cases involving vol-
untary federal creditors.49 In adopting state law for determin-
ing priority among competing lien creditors, the Court rejected
the rigid preference for federal liens that the federal rule of
choateness created.50 In reaching its conclusion, the Court ap-
plied a three-part test to decide when courts should adopt state
law as the federal rule of decision.51 The Court considered (1)
whether the program by its nature requires application of uni-
form federal law, (2) whether application of state law frustrates
specific objectives of the federal program, and (3) the extent to
which application of a uniform federal rule would disrupt com-
mercial relationships predicated on state law.5 2
In applying the first prong of the test to the SBA and
FmHA, the Court found that the programs did not require
adoption of a uniform federal rule.5 3 The Court found that the
lack of a uniform federal rule of priority would not burden the
loan processing of either the SBA or FmHA because local of-
fices administered the programs and loan processing already re-
ceived individualized attention5 4
In applying the second prong of the test, the Court deter-
mined that adopting state law would not conflict with the oper-
ation or specific objectives of the SBA and FmHA programs,
because adoption would not burden the agencies' lending activi-
ties.55 The Court rejected the government's argument that the
48. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
49. For a discussion of the Kimbell decision see Comment, Formulating a
Federal Rule of Decision in Commercial Transactions After Kimbell, 66 IOwA
L. REV. 391 (1980).
50. Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 733-38. See supra note 17.
51. 440 U.S. at 728-29.
52. Id.
53. In concluding its analysis of the first prong of the test, the Court
stated that "[s]ince there is no indication that variant state priority schemes
would burden current methods of loan processing, we conclude that considera-
tions of administrative convenience do not warrant adoption of a uniform fed-
eral law." Id. at 733.
54. Id. at 730-33. The Court cited SBA and FroHA regulations mandating
compliance with state procedural requirements in the perfection of security in-
terests. Id- at 730-32 & n.25 & 27. In addition, the Court noted that adoption
of the Uniform Commercial Code in almost every state lessened the adminis-
trative burden of following state law. Id at 733 n.28.
55. The Court stated that "without a showing that application of state
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Court should protect against deficient mortgage recoveries
under the loan programs to the same extent that it has pro-
tected against deficient tax recoveries.56 The Court noted that
the SBA and Fm-A have social welfare objectives distinct
from the interests of federal agencies that primarily raise and
collect revenue.57 The SBA and FmHA, the Court found, oc-
cupy essentially the same position as private lenders and there-
fore do not require special treatment to remain financially
sound.58 Consequently, even though adoption of state priority
law would add to the agencies' costs, the Court held that such
adoption would not conflict with the federal objectives of the
SBA or the FmHA.59
Finally, applying the third prong of the test, the Court
noted that the choateness doctrine often allowed federal liens
arising later in time to take priority over private liens, in viola-
tion of creditors' just expectations.60 In the absence of "impor-
tant national interests,"6' 1 the Court refused to formulate a
uniform rule of priority that might bring unforeseen adverse
consequences and that might create new uncertainties in com-
mercial transactions.62 Thus, the Court held that its three-
laws would impair federal operations, we decline to extend to new contexts
extraordinary safeguards largely rejected by Congress." Id. at 738. The Court
was referring to retention of the choateness doctrine, even though Congress
had amended the tax lien act to allow priority to certain private liens. See id.
56. The choateness test developed as a parallel to federal tax lien prefer-
ences applied to insolvent taxpayers. Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 721 n.8. The Court
in Kimbell also specifically rejected the argument that a uniform federal rule
was necessary to protect the federal treasury, because the Court found that
state remedies were adequate. Id. at 730.
57. The Court stated that "[w]e believe that had Congress intended the
private commercial sector, rather than the taxpayers in general, to bear the
risks of default entailed by these public welfare programs, it would have estab-
lished a priority scheme displacing state law." Id- at 735.
58. The Court in Kimbell determined that because the SBA and FmHA
evaluated the risks in each loan application, the agencies could secure their fi-
nancial interests. Id- at 736-37. Consequently, the Court found that "[t]he
Government therefore is in substantially the same position as private lenders,
and the special status it seeks is unnecessary to safeguard the public fisc." Id.
at 737. The Court noted further that "Congress' admonitions to extend loans
judiciously supports the view that it did not intend to confer special privileges
on agencies that enter the commercial field." Id at 737.
59. See supra note 55.
60. Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 739.
61. Id. at 740.
62. The Court stated that "[b]ecause the ultimate consequences of altering
settled commercial practices are so difficult to foresee.., we hesitate to create
new uncertainties, in the absence of careful legislative deliberation." Id at
739-40. The Court noted that government priority might discourage credit to
the very people whom the programs were designed to benefit. Id. n.43.
[Vol. 73:171
1988] STATE LAW AND FEDERAL CREDITORS 183
prong test mandated adoption of state law as the federal rule of
decision in lien priority, cases involving voluntary federal
creditors.63
C. APPLICATION OF THE KMBELL TEST TO FORECLOSURE BY
VOLUNTARY FEDERAL CREDITORS
Federal courts have generated two divergent lines of deci-
sions in applying the Kimbell test to foreclosures by voluntary
federal creditors. One line interprets Kimbell as instructing
the courts to treat federal agencies as private parties and to
adopt state law when the federal program can function effec-
tively thereunder. 64 The other line of decisions follows Sta-
dium and rejects adoption of state law, citing the need for
federal uniformity and the need to protect federal agencies
from financial loss.65 Although the circuit courts have distin-
guished their divergent opinions factually to avoid direct con-
flict,6 6 the different interpretations of Kimbell among the
circuits have led to inconsistent decisions at the district court
level.6 7
1. Application of Kimbell Favoring the Adoption
of State Law
In Chicago Title Insurance Co. v. Sherred Village Associ-
ates ("Sherred "),68 a First Circuit case decided soon after Kim-
bell, the court extended Kimbell's holding by adopting a state
mechanic's lien law to determine the priority of a HUD secur-
ity interest.69 In analyzing the first prong of the Kimbell test,
63. 1i at 740. The Court held that "absent a congressional directive, the
relative priority of private liens and consensual liens arising from these Gov-
ernment lending programs [such as SBA and FmHA] is to be determined
under nondiscrimatory state laws." IML
State law appears to be "discriminatory" if it singles out federal actors for
special treatment. See United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S.
580, 608 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("Implicit in the holdings of a
number of our cases dealing with state taxation and regulatory measures ap-
plied to the Federal Government is that such measures must be
nondiscriminatory.").
64. See infra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
65. See infra notes 78-90 and accompanying text.
66. See infra notes 73-85 and accompanying text.
67. See infra note 90.
68. 708 F.2d 804 (1st Cir. 1983).
69. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the initial First Circuit
opinion, which held that the state mechanic's lien law could not be adopted, to
be reevaluated in light of the Kimbell decision. Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Sher-
red Village Assocs., 441 U.S. 901 (1979). The First Circuit had held that a fed-
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the First Circuit panel held that, because HUD scrutinized ap-
plications individually through field offices staffed by local
counsel, the HUD program did not "by its nature" require a
uniform federal rule of decision. 0 Applying the second ele-
ment of the Kimbell test, the Sherred court decided that even
though adoption of state mechanic's lien laws might disrupt
HUD's financing system, the agency and its affiliates could
nonetheless operate effectively under state law and achieve
their objectives.71 Under the third part of the Kimbell test, the
eral lien held by HUD had priority over a mechanic's lien under the
choateness doctrine. Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Sherred Village Assocs., 568 F.2d
217, 222 (1st Cir. 1978), vacated and remanded, 441 U.S. 901 (1979). On remand
the First Circuit stated, "[w]e have been charged by the Supreme Court with
the responsibility of determining whether the facts of this case are sufficiently
different from those in United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc. . . . to necessitate a
federal rule of decision in priority disputes involving HUD mortgages." Sher-
red, 708 F.2d at 806.
70. In Sherred, the court found that adoption of state mechanic's lien laws
was not distinguishable from adoption of state priority laws covered by the
U.C.C., because HUD individually scrutinized applications through field offices
staffed by local counsel. Sherred, 708 F.2d at 810-11. Furthermore, the court
did not find that administration of the HUD program was distinguishable from
the SBA and FmHA programs in Kimbell, because HUD mortgage forms were
not tailored to individual states. Id. Thus, the court concluded that adoption
of state law would not greatly increase HUD's administrative burden, and the
program did not require application of a uniform federal rule of decision. Id.
The First Circuit held that the district court's finding that the HUD pro-
gram did not require application of a uniform rule of decision was not clearly
erroneous. Id. The court upheld the finding that adoption of state mechanic's
lien laws would not excessively burden HUD's administration of the program.
Id.
71. Id. at 811. With reference to the second prong of the Kimbell test,
HUD argued that the absence of a rule that provided for absolute federal pri-
ority would frustrate its program's objectives. Id. According to HUD, primary
lenders and subsequent purchasers of HUD mortgages would be unwilling to
participate in HUD programs if they had to assume the risk of having their
interests subordinated to a mechanic's lien. Id. HUD claimed that "HUD
projects will come to a halt in those states [that allow mechanics' liens to re-
late back to the time construction began] and there will be no more federally
insured low and moderate income housing there." Id.
The facts of Sherred demonstrate the obstruction of the HUD program.
See id. at 806. Sherred Village as a developer may apply for a loan to be in-
sured by HUD if the project and financial agreements meet certain specifica-
tions. A private lender makes the loan to the developer and HUD insures the
loan. Title insurance for the benefit of the private lender insures the devel-
oper's title. The private lender warrants to HUD that the mortgage is the first
lien on the property. Upon default by the developer, the private lender may
assign the mortgage to HUD and HUD will pay the lender some agreed por-
tion of the debt.
Although there is always notice of a contractor's potential mechanic's lien
where property is being improved, the contractor may not file the lien until it
fails to receive payment that is due. In many states, to protect contractors who
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court noted that state mechanic's lien laws were the only pro-
tection available to contractors, and that such state protections
should be displaced only for compelling reasons. 72
The Fifth Circuit, when applying the Kimbell test, consist-
ently has adopted state law as the rule of decision. It adopted
state deficiency law in an SBA foreclosure,73 adopted state law
to determine the reasonableness of an SBA foreclosure sale,74
and held that federal insolvency statutes do not apply to con-
sensual liens.75 The Fifth Circuit characterized Kimbell as a
"very detailed opinion for a unanimous Court that sought to
carefully instruct Government agencies that in their commer-
have improved the property, courts deem a mechanic's lien perfected at the
time work began. Thus, a mechanic's lien that did not appear in the title
search may arise after the mortgage is taken, yet a court will deem it prior in
time and interest by state law.
HUD maintained a policy of not enforcing the warranty of the lender as to
title, and argued that lenders would not participate in the program if title in-
surance would not cover the mechanic's lien. Id at 811. Based on testimony of
initiating lenders, however, the court in Sherred concluded the district court
had not clearly erred in finding that the potential risk of mechanic's liens
would not deter lenders because they would be able to obtain title insurance
coverage. Id
HUD also contended that adoption of state law would undermine the
mortgage-backed securities program, the Government National Mortgage As-
sociation (GNMA), which funds 80% of HUD programs. Id at 811-12. By
purchasing low-cost construction mortgages from primary lenders and then by
auctioning the mortgages at a loss, the GNMA subsidizes and encourages low-
cost construction loans. Id In response to HUD's argument that purchasers at
the GNMA auction would be unwilling to risk exposure to mechanics' liens,
the district court noted that GNMA contracts obligated GNMA to make good
such defects, and that GNMA could then collect on the warranty from the
lender. Id GNMA also guarantees securities issued by private lenders holding
pools of HUD mortgages as collateral, and HUD argued that late-arising
mechanics' liens could undermine the stability of the securities and force the
GNMA to repurchase securities if a mechanic's lien interest intervened. The
court acknowledged that application of state law to the priority of mechanics'
liens might cause GNMA to repurchase securities if a mechanic's lien arose.
Id at 812.
Although problems in GNMA operation would arise from the adoption of
state law, the court believed that HUD and GNMA could still function effec-
tively under the mechanic's lien laws. The court stated that GNMA will "find
other ways of satisfying themselves that the risk is small enough to proceed
with most of the mortgage portfolios despite the presence of a mechanics' lien
on one of the mortgages." Id at 812. The court stated that if it misunderstood
the impact on HUD, a legislative or regulative remedy would be forthcoming.
Id at 813.
72. The court stated that "[a]bsent compelling reasons to displace state
law, the relationships are best governed by those local rules." Id at 813.
73. United States v. Dismuke, 616 F.2d 755, 758-59 (5th Cir. 1980).
74. United States v. Irby, 618 F.2d 352, 355 (5th Cir. 1980).
75. United States v. S.K.A. Assocs., 600 F.2d 513, 516 (5th Cir. 1979).
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cial lending activities they are subject to 'customary commercial
practices,' and should fare no better, and no worse, than a pri-
vate lender. '7 6 The Fifth Circuit determined that the SBA
could comply with state procedures and protect its interests
without being hindered in its administration or frustrated in its
objectives.77
2. Narrowing the Application of Stadium in the Ninth
Circuit by Adoption of State Law in SBA and
FmHA Foreclosures
The Ninth Circuit has developed its own criteria to deter-
mine when to adopt state law in voluntary federal creditor
cases.78 Although the circuit narrowed the application of Sta-
76. Id. at 516 (citation omitted). This quote appears in both Irby and Dis-
muke. Irby, 618 F.2d at 355; Dismuke, 616 F.2d at 759.
77. See Irby, 618 F.2d at 355 ("It has not been demonstrated that adoption
of the nondiscriminatory laws of Mississippi would prejudice the SBA's admin-
istration of its loan programs."); Dismuke, 616 F.2d at 759 ("state law incorpo-
ration would in no way hinder the administration of the loan program and...
the statute [requiring judicial confirmation to obtain deficiency judgment]
presents no difficulty to the SBA in protecting itself").
78. Although the Ninth Circuit acknowledges Kimbell for the proposition
that federal law applies to cases involving foreclosure by voluntary federal
creditors, the court has not applied the Kimbell test explicitly. Instead, the
court has developed its own tests over time that consider factors similar to the
Kimbell factors.
The Ninth Circuit acknowledged the first element of the Kimbell test
when it indicated that individualized negotiation was a prerequisite to adop-
tion of state redemption laws. See United States v. MacKenzie, 510 F.2d 39, 40-
41 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (courts should recognize state redemption rights
when: (1) a contract is individually negotiated with no provision purporting to
waive state rights; (2) no federal statute or regulation purports to nullify the
right; and (3) there is no overriding federal interest).
In United States v. Pastos, 781 F.2d 747 (9th Cir. 1986), however, the Ninth
Circuit adopted state redemption law in an SBA foreclosure, abandoning the
uniformity aspect of its test. The court recognized that the SBA loan was simi-
lar to the FHA loan in Stadium because both agreements expressly waived re-
demption rights and were not individually negotiated. Id. at 750. Although
the court had used negotiation, waiver, and uniformity factors to distinguish
cases in the past, see United States v. Stadium Apartments, Inc., 425 F.2d 358,
363 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970), the court held that such factors
were not conclusive and relied on the balancing of state and federal concerns,
1d.
The Ninth Circuit has relied on a rule, similar to the distillation of the
second and third prongs of the Kimbell test, as reformulated infra notes 136-
157 and accompanying text, that "courts should not 'create federal law by im-
plication that is antithetical to state laws protecting debtors unless doing so is
necessary to achieve the overriding purposes of Congress in enacting the stat-
utes under which the loans were made or to preserve some other paramount
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dium 7 9 in decisions adopting state redemption laws in foreclo-
sures by the SBA8 0 and the FmHA,8 1 it has not disavowed
entirely its reasoning in Stadium.8 2 The Ninth Circuit no
longer maintains that courts cannot uphold any nonuniform
state debtor protections restricting the remedies of the United
States.8 3 The circuit continues to maintain, however, that appli-
cation of state redemption rights to an FHA foreclosure, as in
Stadium, is distinguishable from application of state redemp-
tion rights in SBA and FmHA foreclosures.8 4 The court re-
cently stated that adoption of state redemption laws would
obstruct the FHA's objective of increasing available housing by
causing the FHA higher foreclosure costs, whereas the adoption
of state redemption law furthers the SBA's and FmHA's re-
spective goals of assisting small businesses and farmers.8 5
federal interest.'" Pastas, 781 F.2d at 751 (citing United States v. MacKenzie,
510 F.2d 39, 40 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc)).
Ninth Circuit acknowledgment of the third Kimbell factor is evident from
the court's statement that "[a]lthough we recognize that application of state
redemption laws to SBA loans upsets federal uniformity, rejection would also
unnecessarily introduce a lack of uniformity into debtor-creditor relationships
within a state. 'No federal interest requires such an intrusion into state regula-
tion of commercial transactions."' Id at 752 (citing United States v. Crain, 589
F.2d 996, 1000 (9th Cir. 1979)).
79. See supra notes 34-47 and accompanying text.
80. United States v. Pastas, 781 F.2d 747, 751-52 (9th Cir. 1986).
81. United States v. Ellis, 714 F.2d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 1983).
82. The Ninth Circuit began narrowing the applicability of Stadium even
before Kimbell. In United States v. MacKenzie, 510 F.2d 39 (9th Cir. 1975) (en
banc), the court adopted state deficiency law in an SBA foreclosure sale. The
court discounted the federal interest in protecting the federal fisc by noting
that the SBA is required to make loans only "so... as reasonably to assure
repayment." I& at 42 n.2 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 636(2)(7)) (emphasis added by the
court). The court followed United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966), and
distinguished Stadium on the grounds that the SBA loan had been individu-
ally negotiated. Mackenzie, 510 F.2d at 42. The court expressly withheld ap-
proval of Stadium, noting that it expressed no view on the merits of that case.
I&.
83. This proposition is evident from the Ninth Circuit cases that adopted
state redemption and deficiency laws, although the laws were not uniform and
restricted the remedies of the United States. See Pastas, 781 F.2d at 752
(adopting state redemption law in SBA foreclosure despite lack of uniformity
and added costs); Ellis, 714 F.2d at 955 (adopting state redemption law despite
added costs to FmHA); MacKenzie, 510 F.2d at 42 (stating that adoption of
state debtor protections does not pose any significant threat to federal govern-
ment interests in loan repayment).
84. See Pastos, 781 F.2d at 752 (distinguishing Stadium in adoption of
Montana's redemption law in SBA foreclosure).
85. The court stated that "FHA [National Housing Act] cases such as Sta-
dium Apartments are distinguishable from the SBA and FmHA cases because
higher foreclosure costs decrease the amount of funds available for the Na-
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3. Eighth Circuit Adherence to the Reasoning in Stadium
Despite Kimbell
The Eighth Circuit has been reluctant to adopt state law
and has continued uncritically to follow the reasoning in Sta-
dium.86 The court has relied on the arguments that it cannot
adopt state law as the federal rule of decision if the substance
of the law varies from state to state,87 if state law limits the ef-
fectiveness of the federal creditors' remedies, 8  or if the United
States has an overriding interest in protecting government in-
vestments.8 9 Although no Eighth Circuit decision has acknowl-
tional Housing Act's primary purpose of making available as much housing as
possible." United States v. Pastas, 781 F.2d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing
United States v. Ellis, 714 F.2d 953, 956 (9th Cir. 1983)).
The Pastos court acknowledged that redemption laws served the impor-
tant state interest of preventing the government from "reaping double recov-
ery" by purchasing the property below market price and then obtaining a
deficiency judgment. Id. at 751. The court found that applying state redemp-
tion law in an SBA foreclosure would be consistent with the SBA's goal of as-
sisting small business. Id.
The court did not indicate why application of redemption laws creates a
greater financial burden on the FHA than on the other programs, nor did the
court state why it did not equate financial loss by the SBA with a decrease in
loans to small businesses in the same manner as it equated loss by the FHA
with fewer loans for housing. The court has acknowledged that adoption of
"state redemption laws does not impair... the federal interest in having the
loans repaid." Id. at 751 (citing United States v. MacKenzie, 510 F.2d 39, 41-42
(9th Cir. 1975) (en banc)).
Although an insurance fund backs the HUD loans, such backing would
constitute a valid distinction only on a showing that adoption of state redemp-
tion laws would significantly impair the fund.
86. The Eighth Circuit has indicated that it would adopt state law if the
applicable state law were the Uniform Commercial Code. The court in United
States v. Landmark Park & Assocs., 795 F.2d 683, 686 (8th Cir. 1986), stated
that "[w]e have incorporated state law as the federal rule of decision when the
state law is derived from a uniform statute such as the Uniform Commercial
Code and to do so would therefore not hinder the 'federal interest in uniform-
ity of the law.'" (citing United States v. Kukowski, 735 F.2d 1057, 1058 (8th
Cir. 1984) (adopting state U.C.C. notice requirement in the sale of collateral)).
87. See Landmark, 795 F.2d at 687 (refusing to adopt state law governing
interests in rents and profits because of variation in state law); United States
v. Victory Highway Village, Inc., 662 F.2d 488, 498 (8th Cir. 1981) (refusing to
adopt state law in HUD foreclosure primarily because redemption law varies
from state to state).
88. Both Landmark and Victory quote the View Crest language, see supra
notes 28-31 and accompanying text, that "[l]ocal rules limiting the effective-
ness of the remedies available to the United States for breach of a federal duty
can not [sic] be adopted." Landmark, 795 F.2d at 686; Victory, 662 F.2d at 497.
The Landmark decision acknowledged that courts could adopt state law if a
uniform rule were not necessary to protect a federal interest. Id. at 686.
89. The Eighth Circuit in Victory stated that the court could not support
local rules limiting the effectiveness of United States remedies because of an
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edged conflict with decisions from other circuits, district court
decisions within the Eighth Circuit directly contradict decisions
in the Fifth and Ninth Circuits, reflecting the Eighth Circuit's
reluctance to adopt state lawP9
II. MISAPPLICATION OF KIMBELL AS A RESULT OF
ADHERENCE TO STADIUM
In view of the Court's analysis in Kimbell, the Eighth and
Ninth Circuit decisions that refused to adopt state law relied on
factual distinctions that do not justify results different from
those reached in similar cases in the First, Fifth, and Ninth Cir-
cuits. In choosing rules of decision in voluntary federal creditor
cases, some courts either have failed to recognize the relevance
of Kimbell,91 or have applied the Kimbell test in a cursory fash-
"'overriding federal interest in protecting the funds of the United States and
in securing federal investments...."' Victory, 662 F.2d at 497 (citing United
States v. Scholnick, 606 F.2d 160, 164 (6th Cir. 1979)). Landmark stated the
same argument. Landmark, 795 F.2d at 686.
In Victory, the court did not recognize Kimbell as applicable authority,
but instead followed Stadium and Scholnick. See Victory, 662 F.2d at 497. In
Landmark, however, the court addressed each prong of the Kimbell test with-
out specifically stating it was doing so. See Landmark, 795 F.2d at 685-88.
90. Compare United States v. Elverud, 640 F. Supp. 692, 696 (D.N.D. 1986)
(rejecting state redemption law in FmHA foreclosure) and United States v.
Larson, 632 F. Supp. 1565, 1568 (D.N.D. 1986) (rejecting state deficiency proce-
dure in SBA case) with United States v. Ellis, 714 F.2d 953, 957 (9th Cir. 1983)
(adopting state law providing a redemption right in FmHA case) and United
States v. Dismuke, 616 F.2d 755, 759 (5th Cir. 1980) (adopting state deficiency
law in SBA case).
Courts within the Tenth Circuit have arrived at varying results in apply-
ing the Kimbell test. Compare United States v. Curry, 561 F. Supp. 429 (D.
Kan. 1983) (upholding FmHA contractual waiver of state redemption rights
contrary to state law) with United States v. Hargrove, 494 F. Supp. 22 (D.N.M.
1979) (adopting state law that prohibits waiver of state redemption rights).
The decision in Curry also conflicts with the decision in Ellis.
Arguably, the difference in judgment may result from differences in the
state redemption laws. The redemption period in New Mexico is only nine
months, whereas the Kansas redemption period is one year and provides that
the debtor may remain in possession during the redemption period. Compare
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 39-5-18 (Supp. 1987) with KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-2414 (1983).
On the other hand, the federal agency can obtain a receiver if the security for
the loan is endangered, and the Kansas law indicates the strong state interest
in protecting debtors.
91. In United States v. Victory Highway Village, Inc., 662 F.2d 488, 494-95
(8th Cir. 1981), which refused to adopt state redemption law in an FHA fore-
closure, the Eighth Circuit failed even to mention Kimbell. The Victory court
cited United States v. Scholnick, 606 F.2d 160 (6th Cir. 1979). In that case the
Sixth Circuit cited both Kimbell and Sherred for the proposition that federal
lien priority is based on the doctrine of "first in time ... is first in right," but
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ion, failing adequately to distinguish the facts in Kimbell.92 The
following analysis demonstrates that the decisions rejecting
adoption of state redemption and deficiency laws are not factu-
ally distinguishable from Kimbell and suggests that, had the
courts correctly applied Kimbell, they would have adopted state
law.
A. FEDERAL PROGRAMS Do NOT "By THEIR NATURE"
REQUIRE APPLICATION OF A UNIFORM FEDERAL RULE
OF DECISION
The Supreme Court in Kimbell declared that state law
could not prevail when federal programs "by their nature" re-
quired a uniform federal rule of decision.93 In addressing the
need for uniformity in adoption of state lien priority law, the
Kimbell Court considered the effect of adopting state law on
the administration of the SBA and FmHA programs.94 The
Court held that because these agencies administered their pro-
then determined without analysis that there was no federal right of redemp-
tion under Stadium. Scholnick, 606 F.2d at 166-67.
92. In its decision to reject adoption of state redemption laws in an SBA
case, the district court in United States v. Larson, 632 F. Supp. 1565 (D.N.D.
1986), analyzed the Kimbell factors in one paragraph. The court's analysis was
as follows:
In considering the need for a nationally uniform body of law, this
court feels the state has a strong interest in its laws affecting real es-
tate liens and that the state interest is at least as strong as the need
for a nationally uniform body of law on remedies available to SBA.
To the extent the objectives of the SBA's lending program include the
government's recoupment of monies loaned, application of the state
law would frustrate objectives of the SBA program. The final factor
to be considered under Kimbell Foods, the extent to which application
of a federal rule would disrupt commercial relationships predicated
on state law, is of less significance. The loan documents specify that
federal law governs, so it does not appear the SBA-Larson transaction
was predicated on state law. Further, there are not commercial rela-
tionships involving parties outside the SBA-Larson transaction to be
considered; the question addressed in this order is different in that re-
spect from the lien priority questions addressed in the May 29, 1985
order.
Larson, 632 F. Supp. at 1568. The case cited Victory and two other Eighth Cir-
cuit cases finding that federal law preempted state law, and explicitly refused
to acknowledge contrary decisions in other circuits. Id. at 1569.
93. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 728 (1979). The
Court in Kimbell cited United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 354 (1966), for the
above proposition. The Court in Yazell held that an emergency loan program
under the SBA did not require a uniform federal rule of decision and adopted
state coverture laws (laws limiting the right of married women to dispose of
property). Yazell, 382 U.S. at 348-58; see supra note 33.
94. Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 730-33. The Court found that "[b]y using local
lending offices and employees who are familiar with the law of their respec-
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grams locally and scrutinized applications individually, adop-
tion of state priority law would not hinder the effective
administration of their programs.9 5
The post-Kimbell courts that refused to adopt state law be-
cause of the perceived need for a uniform federal rule of deci-
sion failed properly to apply the analysis in Kimbell.9 6 For
example, the Eighth Circuit has made determinations based on
an abstract federal interest in uniformity, rather than by ana-
lyzing the actual administrative burden created by the adoption
of state law, as the Court did in Kimbell.9 7 The Eighth Circuit's
cursory uniformity analysis98 emanates from an overly broad
and uncritical reading of frequently cited language from
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, in which the Court stated
that when law varies from state to state, adoption of state law
will create uncertainty in transactions and subject federal gov-
ernment interests to the vagaries of state law.99 The Clearfield
tive localities, the agencies function effectively without uniform procedures
and legal rules." Id. at 732.
95. Id
96. See supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text.
97. The Eighth Circuit in United States v. Landmark Park & Assocs., 795
F.2d 683, 686-87 (8th Cir. 1986), rejected the adoption of state law on the sole
ground that a mortgagee's right to rents and profits varied from state to state.
The court failed to analyze the administrative burden resulting from the varia-
tions in state laws and rested its decision on an abstract need for uniformity.
Id. The Eighth Circuit's shallow analysis also appeared in United States v.
Kukowski, 735 F.2d 1057 (8th Cir. 1984), where the court adopted state law to
determine a loan guarantor's right to notice upon disposition of collateral by
the SBA. The court, citing Kimbell, looked only to the uniformity factor in
making its determination and stated that "[iun this case, where the state law
on which private creditors base their daily commercial transactions is derived
from a uniform statute, there is little or no concern that the federal interest in
uniformity of the law will be hindered." Kukowski, 735 F.2d at 1058 (citing
Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 729).
98. See Landmark, 795 F.2d at 686-87 (stating that courts cannot accept
varying state law determining perfection of assignment of rents because to do
so would create uncertainty); United States v. Victory Highway Village, Inc.,
662 F.2d 488, 498 (8th Cir. 1981) (stating that adoption of state redemption
rights as federal rule of decision would subject FA to vagaries of state law).
99. In the Clearfield Trust Court's words:
The issuance of commercial paper by the United States is on a vast
scale and transactions in that paper from issuance to payment will
commonly occur in several states. The application of state law...
would subject the rights and duties of the United States to excep-
tional uncertainty. It would lead to great diversity in results by mak-
ing identical transactions subject to the vagaries of the laws of the
several states.
318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943). Adoption of state mortgage law, on the other hand,
would not create uncertainty because the law of the state where the mortgage
originated would determine the rights and duties of the federal agency.
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Trust argument does not apply to foreclosure cases, however,
because courts can easily determine the relevant state law.100
The Kimbell test did not ask whether the law is uniform
among the states, but rather asked whether adoption of state
law would burden the effective administration of the federal
program.' 01 Kimbell reasoned that any agency scrutinizing in-
dividual applications through local or regional offices could
function effectively under state mortgage law.102 Only diverse
state law requiring local "machinery" that such an agency did
not have the power to obtain would hinder that agency's ad-
ministration. The SBA, the FHA (administered by HUD), and
the FmHA each give individual scrutiny to applications for fi-
nancial assistance through local offices.' 0 3 Consequently, these
agencies should be able to administer their programs effectively
despite variations in mortgage law from state to state. 0 4 Anal-
100. Commentators have criticized the Clearfleld Trust case for asserting
an administrative burden that may be minimal in view of the availability of
conflict of laws doctrines used to determine rights for privately issued com-
mercial paper. See Mishkin, supra note 3, at 828-32.
The court in Stadium also made the analogy to Clearfield Trust and stated
that because redemption laws varied from state to state, adoption of state law
would subject the FHA to the vagaries of state law. United States v. Stadium
Apartments, Inc., 425 F.2d 358, 364 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926
(1970). Further confusing the uniformity issue, the court in Stadium argued
that to adopt state law would require the court to choose a particular state law
and apply it in every state. Id This argument is quite different from
Clearfield Trust's argument that because commercial paper may pass through
many states with different laws, the legal rights of the United States would be
uncertain at any particular point in time. See Note, State Statutory Redemp-
tion Rights and the Federal Housing Administration: Reconciliation of Real
and Illusory Conflicts, 49 B.U.L. REV. 717, 727 (1969). Other courts have not
had trouble conceptualizing the adoption of the law of the state where the
mortgage was originated as the federal rule of decision. See United States v.
Ellis, 714 F.2d 953, 954-57 (9th Cir. 1983) (adopting state redemption laws as
the federal rule of decision in FmHA case).
101. See supra text accompanying notes 51-54.
102. Even though the Court in Kimbell noted that the administrative bur-
den on the SBA and FrnHA would be minimal because of the applicability of
the U.C.C., the Court did not indicate that application of the U.C.C. was a deci-
sive factor. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 732 n.28 (1979).
103. See supra notes 54, 70.
104. The Supreme Court in Kimbell expressly found that the adoption of
state lien priority law would not burden the administration of the SBA and
FmHA because local offices individually scrutinized the loans. Kimbell, 440
U.S. at 730-33. For the same reason, the adoption of mortgage law would not
be significantly more burdensome in the processing of loans under the pro-
grams.
Adoption of state mortgage law would not burden the administration of
the FHA loan programs because each loan already is scrutinized individually.
See Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Sherred Village Assocs., 708 F.2d 804, 811 (1st Cir.
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ysis of the first part of the Kimbell test indicates that none of
these programs by their nature requires the application of a
uniform federal rule of law.
B. FRUSTRATION OF FEDERAL OBJECTIVES BY THE ADOPTION
OF STATE MORTGAGE LAW
Courts that declined to adopt state redemption and defi-
ciency laws relied primarily on the need to protect the federal
treasury. 10 5 Restating this argument in terms of the second ele-
ment of the Kimbell test, the courts argued that adoption of
state laws would increase agency costs and thereby frustrate
specific objectives of the programs, 10 6 especially when the FHA
receives assignment of a mortgage through its insurance pro-
gram and attempts to foreclose.'0 7 Courts that rejected the
1983) (upholding district court finding that adoption of state lien priority law
would not burden HUD administration of FHA loan program).
Some courts distinguished the administration of the FHA from that of the
SBA and FmHA based upon the lack of individualized negotiation in loans by
the FHA. See United States v. MacKenzie, 510 F.2d 39, 41-42 (9th Cir. 1975)
(en banc) (considering individualized negotiation in adopting state law in SBA
foreclosure); Stadium, 425 F.2d at 363 (distinguishing individualized negotia-
tion in Yazell from FHA loan). The Ninth Circuit, however, subsequently
held that individualized negotiation is not relevant in determining whether
courts should apply state law. United States v. Pastos, 781 F.2d 747, 750 (9th
Cir. 1986).
Incidentally, it appears that loans granted by the FHA are the product of
extensive negotiation and regulation. See Note, State Statutory Redemption
Rights and the Federal Housing Administration; Reconciliation of Real and 17-
lusory Conflicts, 49 B.U.L. REV. 717, 731-32 (1969). Local offices use state pro-
cedures and forms tailored to the individual states that administer the FHA.
1d. The FHA also may negotiate terms and specifications. Id, The Multifam-
ily Mortgage Act now governs foreclosure of multifamily project loans, such as
the loan at bar in Stadium. See supra note 4. Even if individualized negotia-
tion is relevant, it seems that the FHA gives adequate individualized attention
to prevent an excessive burden on the agency. Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 731-33.
105. See supra notes 84-90.
106. See United States v. Victory Highway Village, Inc., 662 F.2d 488, 495
(8th Cir. 1981) (declining to adopt state redemption rights because of overrid-
ing federal interest in protecting treasury and preserving assets of FHA insur-
ance fund); United States v. Scholnick, 606 F.2d 160, 164 (6th Cir. 1979)
(declining to adopt state redemption rights because of overriding federal inter-
est in protecting treasury and preserving assets of FHA insurance fund);
United States v. Elverud, 640 F. Supp. 692, 696 (D.N.D. 1986) (declining to
adopt state redemption rights because adoption would frustrate federal objec-
tives by increasing costs of FmHA); United States v. Larson, 632 F. Supp. 1565,
1568 (D.N.D. 1986) (declining to adopt state deficiency laws because adoption
would frustrate federal objective by increasing costs of SBA).
107. The "protection of the treasury" rationale was first presented in
United States v. View Crest Garden Apartments, Inc., 268 F.2d 380, 383 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 884 (1959). See supra notes 28-31 and accompany-
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adoption of state law on the basis of increased costs to the FHA,
however, failed to distinguish Kimbell. These courts did not
demonstrate any difference between the additional expense
caused by the adoption of state debtor protections and the addi-
tional expense incurred by the adoption of state priority law in
Kimbell.108 To justify rejecting adoption of state redemption or
deficiency laws, a court should find that adoption would not
only be more costly to federal agencies than the cost of the loss
of lien priority in Kimbell to the SBA and FmHA, but would
result in a loss so substantial as to prevent the agencies from
successfully pursuing their objectives.10 9
In determining whether adoption of state lien priority law
would frustrate specific objectives of the FmHA and SBA, the
Court in Kimbell held that the respective objectives of the pro-
grams were to make loans to assist farmers and businesses,
rather than to protect the federal treasury.110 The Court
ing text. In View Crest the court rejected the adoption of state receivership
laws, stating that "[n]ow the federal policy to protect the treasury and to pro-
mote the security of federal investment which in turn promotes the prime
purpose of the [National Housing] Act-to facilitate the building of homes by
use of federal credit-becomes predominate." Id at 383.
The court in Stadium found, from the testimony of agency representa-
tives, that statutory redemption laws increased costs to the F-A and the court
adopted the View Crest language verbatim. United States v. Stadium Apart-
ments, Inc., 425 F.2d 358, 363, 365 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970).
Other courts have followed Stadium apparently without analysis of the actual
financial impact of state redemption or deficiency laws on the program. See,
e.g., Victory, 662 F.2d at 497-98; Scholnick, 606 F.2d at 166-67; Larson, 632 F.
Supp. at 1568-69; United States v. Curry, 561 F. Supp. 429, 430 (D. Kan. 1983).
108. See Victory, 662 F.2d at 497-98; Scholnick, 606 F.2d at 167; Elverud, 640
F. Supp. at 695-96; Larson, 632 F. Supp. at 1568; Curry, 561 F. Supp. at 430; see
also United States v. Pastos, 781 F.2d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 1986) (asserting that
adoption of state redemption law in FHA foreclosure would increase foreclo-
sure costs and reduce funds available for housing loans).
109. The loss of lien priority preference may have resulted in substantial
losses in SBA and FmHA loan collections. See Chicago Title Ins. Co. v. Sher-
red Village Assocs., 708 F.2d 804, 811 (1st Cir. 1983). Nonetheless, the Supreme
Court in Kimbell found that the amounts expended on the SBA and FmHA
programs as a whole were not substantial enough to warrant special protection
by the Court. United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 734 (1979).
The Court stated that "when the United States operates as a moneylending in-
stitution under carefully circumscribed programs, its interest in recouping the
limited sums advanced is of a different order. Thus, there is less need here
than in the tax lien area to invoke protective measures against defaulting debt-
ors in a manner disruptive of existing credit markets." Id.
110. The Court in Kimbell distinguished the SBA and FmHA liens from
federal tax liens and held that the agencies' interests lay not in protecting the
treasury, but in advancing their social welfare objectives "designed to assist
farmers and businesses that cannot obtain funds from private lenders on rea-
sonable terms." Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 735 (footnotes omitted).
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clearly indicated that analysis of the second element of the
Kimbell test requires more than showing additional cost to an
agency before a court may refuse to adopt state law.11'- Instead,
the Court required a showing that adoption of state law would
obstruct the social welfare objectives of the program at issue.1' 2
No court rejecting the adoption of state mortgage law has
discussed evidence that losses on the collection of loans or in-
creased administrative costs would adversely affect the ability
of the agencies to provide their respective financial services.1"3
Loan assistance is based primarily on the qualifications of the
applicants rather than on the availability of funds. 1 4 More-
over, private lenders and mortgage insurers function profitably
under state mortgage law.1 5 Thus, federal agencies, which the
111. Id. at 734-35.
112. The Court in Kimbell stated that "without a showing that application
of state laws would impair federal operations, we decline to extend to new
contexts extraordinary safeguards largely rejected by Congress." Id, at 738.
Thus, the Court in Kimbell must have found that the additional losses to fed-
eral agencies caused by adoption of state priority law would not obstruct the
operation of those agencies.
Moreover, Congress rejected an opportunity to preempt state mortgage
law explicitly by failing to pass the Federal Mortgage Act. See supra note 4.
Congress has passed the Multifamily Mortgage Act, which preempts state re-
demption law where HUD forecloses on multifamily projects. See id. The
court in Sherred, however, rejected the argument that Congress intended to
preempt state law beyond the area explicitly covered by the Act. Chicago Ti-
tle Ins. Co. v. Sherred Village Assocs., 708 F.2d 804, 809-10 (1st Cir. 1983).
113. In the redemption cases, the courts appeared to rely on the testimony
cited in Stadium that statutory redemption rights increase costs. See Victory,
662 F.2d at 497-98; Scholnick, 606 F.2d at 167; Elverud, 640 F. Supp. at 695-96;
Larson, 632 F. Supp. at 1568; Curry, 561 F. Supp. at 430. No case has discussed
the relative amount of these costs, or cited evidence that the amount was so
large as to necessarily reduce the volume of loans available from the agencies.
See supra note 108.
114. Financial constraints obviously exist. Loan amounts are limited and
premiums are calculated based upon collective risk. The point is that the FHA
could maintain its current service under state redemption and deficiency laws.
See infra note 118.
115. Private mortgage insurance has expanded over the last 20 years, albeit
charging higher premium rates on lower amounts than the FHA. See William-
son, The Private Mortgage Insurance Industry, THE MORTGAGE BANKER, Feb.
1980, at 30. States are unlikely to pass legislation that disadvantages lenders
greatly. The trend since the depression has been toward facilitating foreclo-
sure through power of sale procedures. This Note seeks to emphasize that the
federal agencies should not be able to take advantage of the beneficial aspects
of the new procedures and yet not bear the burden of state schemes that pro-
tect debtors. Moreover, should the states ever desire to respond to economic
pressures by reintroducing debtor protections such as moratoriums or work-
out procedures, the courts should be very careful not to cripple the state
scheme by excepting federal creditors from the plan. Mandatory mediation
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Court in Kimbell found to occupy substantially the same posi-
tion as private lenders,116 cannot claim persuasively that costs
created by state redemption and deficiency laws are prohibitive.
The Eighth and Ninth Circuits have asserted that the FHA
has a unique interest in preserving its insurance funds and that
it would suffer a greater burden than either the SBA or FmHA
from adoption of state redemption laws.117 There is no evi-
dence, however, that adoption of state redemption laws would
reduce the amount of services the FHA provides." 8 The FHA
already has repaid the initial federal investment and has
accumulated large net surpluses in the funds intended to be
actuarially sound. 1 9 The FHA appears to be capable of protect-
statutes, however, such as the Minnesota law that prescribes special proce-
dures for federal creditors, need not be adopted to the extent that they treat
federal creditors specially. MINN. STAT. §§ 583.26-.32 (1988). See supra note 63
for a discussion of discriminatory state law.
116. Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 738.
117. See supra note 85.
118. It appears that the FHA generally abides by state redemption and de-
ficiency laws. Letter from Joseph James, HUD Regional Counsel (Region
VII), to Aaron Weiner (January 29, 1988) (discussing HUD policy in FHA fore-
closures). HUD may foreclose on loans made for multifamily projects under
the Multifamily Mortgage Act. Id, The Multifamily Mortgage Act does not
provide redemption rights and the FHA multifamily insured loans are nonre-
course, so that no deficiency judgments may be sought. Id. If HUD forecloses
on either multifamily or single-family loans in state court, state redemption
rights and deficiency procedures are respected. Thus, formal adoption of state
law would not cause a general increase in costs because current procedures ab-
sorb costs from redemption and deficiency laws already. On the other hand,
formal adoption would guarantee equal treatment of debtors.
Moreover, lenders who hold mortgages insured by the FHA have the op-
tion of foreclosing themselves and transferring clear title to the FHA rather
than taking a one percent discount on the insurance settlement and assigning
the mortgage to the FHA. NELSON & WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE TRANSFER, FI-
NANCE, AND DEVELOPMENT 837 (3d ed. 1987) (citing 24 C.F.R. §§ 203.355-.417).
If the lender chooses to foreclose itself, the FHA will reimburse the lender for
foreclosure expenses, which will include added expenses due to redemption
laws as well as the balance of the loan. Id.
The FHA has proposed a regulation to reduce HUD's inventory of proper-
ties by encouraging lenders to foreclose themselves. Id. at 837. The FHA's de-
sire to have lenders foreclose themselves rather than transfer their rights to
the FHA demonstrates that costs associated with state redemption and defi-
ciency laws are not prohibitive, because the FHA pays such costs when the
lender forecloses.
119. The FHA is actuarially sound and has repaid the initial capital in-
vested by the federal government. NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 118, at 826
(3rd ed. 1987). In 1986 the FHA accumulated a $4,073 million surplus from in-
suring single family mortgages and a $22 million surplus from its insurance of
cooperatives. The general and special risk insurance funds, by contrast, ran a
$5.5 billion deficit. OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, BUDGET OF UNITED
STATES GOVERNENT, app. at I-M10 (1988). The net deficit in FHA funds and
[Vol. 73:171
19881 STATE LAW AND FEDERAL CREDITORS 197
ing its interests in securing adequate repayment in the same
manner as private lenders who must abide by state laws. 20
Thus, the argument that adoption of state redemption or
deficiency laws would frustrate federal objectives by reducing
the ability of the agency to fulfill its loan objectives on a sound
financial basis is unsubstantiated factually.-21 The Court indi-
cated in Kimbell that the SBA and FmrHA are essentially in the
same position as private lenders and concluded that the federal
agencies do not need preferential treatment.22 The presump-
tion against disturbing commercial relations in the third aspect
of the Kimbell analysis requires that courts adopt state law un-
less adoption of state law would seriously frustrate achieve-
ment of federal social welfare objectives.
C. THE EFFECT OF ADOPTION OF A UNIFORM FEDERAL RULE
ON COMMERCIAL STABILITY
The third prong of the Kimbell test focuses on the disrup-
tion of commercial relationships that could result from apply-
ing uniform federal rules to voluntary federal creditors instead
of using the state law on which commercial relationships tradi-
tionally are predicated. In light of the uncertain effect on com-
mercial relationships generated by displacing state law, the
Court in Kimbell declared that courts should adopt state law
unless a contrary rule is necessary to protect important federal
interests.123 The Court's reluctance to disrupt commercial rela-
the budgeted congressional appropriation of $169.7 million in 1988 results from
the money lost in special-risk loan programs that were not designed to be actu-
arially sound. See National Housing Act, §§ 235-237, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1750
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
120. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text; note 115.
121. Courts have accepted the assertion from View Crest that losses to the
FHA programs translate directly into fewer loans, despite the apparent lack of
empirical evidence of the actual impact of adoption of state redemption or de-
ficiency laws. See supra notes 105-08 and accompanying text. The surplus that
the FHA programs create indicates that lack of funds does not constrain the
volume of loans. It appears that if courts upheld state mortgage law, the FHA
could still make the loans it otherwise would make on a sound financial basis.
122. See supra note 58.
123. The Court in Kimbell stated:
Because the ultimate consequences of altering settled commercial
practices are so difficult to foresee, we hesitate to create new uncer-
tainties, in the absence of careful legislative deliberation. Of course,
formulating special rules to govern the priority of federal consensual
liens in issue here would be justified if necessary to vindicate impor-
tant national interests.
United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 739-40 (1979) (footnote
omitted).
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tionships by adoption of uniform federal rules suggests a pre-
sumption in favor of state law.12 4 The Court's analysis of the
third prong suggests that, absent the need to protect important
federal interests, it is for Congress to choose whether to dis-
place state law and not for the courts to balance the net bene-
fits of a uniform federal rule against the net benefits of
adopting state law.125 Thus, under Kimbell, courts should up-
hold state law that inconveniences federal agencies or necessi-
tates minor adjustments because a uniform federal rule is not
necessary to protect an important federal interest.2B
It is difficult to assess the disruptive impact of the uniform
rule, adopted in Stadium, that no right of redemption exists in
FHA foreclosures. 2 7 The courts in some post-Kimbell cases re-
jected adoption of state redemption law, arguing that no justi-
fied expectation of redemption exists because it is well
124., See Comment, supra note 49, at 407 (arguing that Kimbell established
presumption in favor of adopting state law as federal rule of decision in com-
mercial transactions).
125. The Court in Kimbell considered the federal interest in protecting the
federal treasury to be insufficient to justify "rejecting well-established com-
mercial rules which have proven workable over time. Thus, [because of the
uncertain effect of altering commercial practices] the prudent course is to
adopt the readymade body of state law as the federal rule of decision until
Congress strikes a different accommodation." Kimbell 440 U.S. at 740 (foot-
note omitted). The Court in Kimbell indicated that the courts were ill-suited
to balance the federal interest against the impact on commercial relationships
because of the uncertainty involved. Id. at 739 n.42.
Adoption of state lien priority schemes, as in Kimbell, is not distinguish-
able from adoption of state redemption law. A court should not override state
regulatory schemes merely because the court decides the scheme is unimpor-
tant. The Court in Kimbell held that unless a uniform federal rule is "neces-
sary to vindicate important national interests," courts should adopt state law.
Id. at 740. It appears from Kimbell that minor financial burdens on federal
agencies are not important enough to justify displacement of state law.
In establishing its three-prong test, the Court in Kimbell rejected the
straight balancing of state and federal interests approach that the court used
in Stadium. The Stadium court expressed doubts that redemption laws served
the purpose of enhancing foreclosure bidding or were necessary to protect jun-
ior lienors, and consequently found that the value of redemption laws did not
outweigh the federal interest in avoiding the added expense that would result
from adoption of state law. Stadium, 425 F.2d at 365-66. The second and third
prongs of the Kimbell test do not provide for balancing unless it is first found
that the application of state law obstructs an important federal interest.
126. The third prong of the Kimbell test suggests that even if a uniform
federal rule is necessary to protect an important national interest (ostensibly
derived from the second aspect of the Kimbell analysis), a court may still up-
hold state law if the disruption to commercial relationships outweighs the na-
tional interest. Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 741.
127. United States v. Stadium Apartments, Inc., 425 F.2d 358, 367 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970).
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established that federal law applies to cases involving voluntary
federal creditors.12s These courts discounted the importance of
the third prong of the Kimbell analysis in redemption and defi-
ciency cases. Kimbell involved priority questions affecting the
rights of third parties without notice of the federal interest, 2 9
whereas the debtors involved in a mortgage foreclosure by a
federal agency would be aware that the mortgage or mortgage
insurance created a federal interest. 130 Although the debtor
may be aware of federal involvement, that involvement might
not indicate to the debtor which state procedures are abro-
gated.131 Moreover, courts should respect state regulatory
schemes in areas traditionally governed by state law. 32 Statu-
128. Neither Scholnick nor Victory applied the Kimbell test because each
assumed that no right to redemption exists under federal law. See United
States v. Victory Highway Village, Inc., 662 F.2d 488, 498 (8th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Scholnick, 606 F.2d 160, 167 (6th Cir. 1979). The court in
Elverud assumed that all parties should be aware of the FmHA's involvement
and thus found that there were no relationships predicated on state law for a
uniform federal rule to disrupt. United States v. Elverud, 640 F. Supp. 692, 696
(D.N.D. 1986). These courts ignored federal law's ability to look to state law
for content, and thus assumed their conclusion that federal law did not include
redemption rights.
129. The Kimbell Court noted that the choateness rule created undisclosed
security interests and undermined the notice filing system. Kimbell, 440 U.S.
at 739 n.42.
130. In assessing the third prong of the Kimbell test, the court in Elverud
found that the loan transaction between Elverud and the FmHA did not affect
relationships with third parties because the debtor as well as junior lienors, for
the most part, would have notice of the FmHA interest. Elverud, 640 F. Supp.
at 696.
The court in United States v. Larson, 632 F. Supp. 1565 (D.N.D. 1986), in
holding that state deficiency laws could apply in an SBA foreclosure, noted
that "there are not commercial relationships involving parties outside the
SBA-Larson transaction to be considered; the question addressed in this order
is different in that respect from the lien priority question addressed in the
May 29, 1985 order." Larson, 632 F. Supp. at 1568. See also United States v.
Landmark Park & Assocs., 795 F.2d 683, 687 (8th Cir. 1986) (stating that com-
mercial relationships are not adversely affected by a uniform federal rule on
the perfection of interests in rents and profits because sufficient notice of fed-
eral interest exists by virtue of recorded assignment).
131. In fact, many jurisdictions have no case law indicating whether or not
courts should apply state redemption or deficiency laws. Moreover, in the case
of HUD, the agency generally abides by state redemption and deficiency laws,
thus giving rise to the expectation that the debtor will enjoy such rights. See
infra note 118.
132. See Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 740 n.44 (citing cases deferring to state law in
absence of congressional action).
Property law is an area of local concern traditionally. See United States v.
Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 591 (1973) (stating that state law
traditionally controls property relationships); United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S.
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tory redemption rights were enacted to protect debtors' equity
in their property, as well as the interests of junior lienors.
Moreover, evaluating the effectiveness of the law is not the fed-
eral courts' role.133
The state legislatures regulate mortgagor-mortgagee rela-
tionships and parties depend on those regulations in commer-
cial transactions.1 Imposition of preferential rules for federal
agencies by the rejection of one aspect of debtor protection cre-
ates uncertainty about the validity of other protections in situa-
tions involving a federal creditor.1' For example, if the
redemption statute of one state is rejected, then the applicabil-
ity of the redemption, upset price, and appraisal statutes of
other states are uncertain. 36 Both debtors and creditors will be
unsure which state procedures and rights courts will adopt and
which they will ignore.
The First and Fifth Circuits correctly adopted state law
that frustrated no specific federal objective. These circuits also
properly refused to give federal agencies special treatment
when the agencies occupied essentially the same position as pri-
vate creditors. Conversely, the Eighth, Sixth, and Ninth Cir-
cuits misinterpreted the uniformity aspect of the Kimbell test
and failed to acknowledge the importance of state interests rec-
ognized in the Kimbell decision.
III. REFORMULATION OF THE KIMBELL TEST TO
ACHIEVE UNIFORM APPLICATION
The diversity of results reached by courts ruling on similar
fact situations indicates that the Kimbell test has not provided
sufficient guidance to lower courts in selecting federal rules of
decision in voluntary federal creditor cases. The following
analysis of the interrelationship of the three prongs of the Kim-
bell test reformulates the test and reduces the three elements
to one rule. The reformulated test requires that courts uphold
nondiscriminatory state law unless doing so would substantially
reduce the ability of the agency to accomplish its fundamental
341, 352 (1966) (stating federal courts should respect state law where family
and family-property relationships are involved).
133. See supra note 125.
134. See Note, Federal Courts Choice of Controlling Law In Cases Involv-
ing Federally Insured Mortgages, 49 N.C.L. REV. 358, 365-66 (1971) (arguing
that adoption of a federal rule makes applicability of other state law
uncertain).
135. See id.
136. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text.
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objectives.137 Such a reformulation promotes more consistent
application among the courts and greatly favors use of state
law.
The first prong of the Kimbell test gives credence to shal-
low arguments favoring uniformity for its own sake, rather
than directing analysis toward the central issue embodied in
the second prong of the test, whether court adoption of state
law would obstruct the operation of the federal program. It is
possible to interpret the first prong of the Kimbell test to mean
that mere administrative convenience is sufficient to override
state statutory schemes. This interpretation, however, is incon-
sistent with the stronger standard in the second prong of the
Kimbell test that requires frustration of specific objectives. By
treating frustration of administration separately from attain-
ment of social welfare objectives, the Court in Kimbell created
conflicting criteria and diluted the content of the second prong
of its test.
The following example demonstrates the inconsistency of
the first and second prongs of the Kimbell test. If the first
prong of the Kimbell test mandates rejection of state deficiency
procedures because they vary from state to state and thereby
increase the administrative costs of a federal agency by $100,000
a year, then courts should also reject adoption of lien priority
law under the U.C.C., as in Kimbell, if adoption would cost the
agency an extra $100,000 a year in lost debt recoveries, although
the extra expense is not administrative. Making the source of
costs a dispositive issue leads to nonsensical results. Certainly
an extra $100,000 in costs would not frustrate the SBA, FmHA,
or FHA in the pursuit of their specific objectives, regardless of
the source of the cost.
In such a case the court should adopt both the state defi-
ciency law and the lien priority law out of respect for state leg-
islative schemes and reluctance to disrupt relationships
predicated on state law. The relevant factor is frustration of
the agency's ability to attain legislative objectives, not the
source of the frustration (administrative or financial). Nothing
peculiar about administrative expenses warrants a separate dis-
cussion of them beyond their potential amount, and that
amount is properly considered under the second prong of the
Kimbell test. The need for uniformity under the second prong
of the test is relevant only if lack of uniformity would frustrate
137. The reformulation is similar to the "major damage" test in YazelL See
supra note 33.
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specific objectives of the federal program. Because the second
prong of the Kimbell test fully encompasses the first, the first
prong should be left out of a reformulation of the test intended
to achieve more consistent application.138
Reading the second and third prongs of the Kimbell test to-
gether reveals that adoption of uniform federal rules, rather
than state law, is necessary where "application of state law
would frustrate specific objectives of the federal programs,"1 39
or "to vindicate important federal interests."1 40 The Court re-
jected the notion that a uniform federal rule was necessary
merely because application of state law inconveniences federal
agencies. What is clear from the holding in Kimbell is that
courts may adopt state law even though it does not advance the
objectives of the federal program and even if application of
state law creates additional expense for federal agencies. 141
The Court's indication that the judiciary should not treat fed-
eral agencies differently from private parties, its apprehension
that adoption of uniform federal rules might cause unforeseen
dislocations in commercial transactions, and its respect for state
legislatures' determinations all indicate that courts should
adopt state law unless adoption would frustrate specific objec-
tives of a federal program. Thus, the second and third prongs
of the Kimbell test can be reformulated into a rule that courts
should apply nondiscriminatory state law in the absence of
proof that it will substantially frustrate the accomplishment of
federal objectives.
138. Adoption of the uniformity test is questionable in the context of
choosing a federal rule of decision in mortgage law cases. The Supreme Court
in Kimbell acknowledged the analogy to Clearfield Trust that View Crest first
espoused, but in its analysis altered the discussion from whether the program
"by its nature" required a uniform federal rule to whether adoption of state
law would "burden administration." Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 728-29. Whether
adoption of state law would burden the administration of a federal program
does not warrant discussion separate from consideration of whether adoption
of state law would frustrate specific federal objectives. See Comment, Adopt-
ing State Law as the Federal Rule of Decisio" A Proposed Test, 43 U. CHI. L.
REV. 823, 834-41 (1976) (distinguishing "conflict" from "uniformity" criteria).
The new test would consider the need for uniformity only when the additional
costs in administration which state law creates are so great as to bar the func-
tioning of the program on a sound financial basis.
As discussed above, the SBA, FmHA, and FHA individually scrutinize
transactions and the courts have concluded that compliance with state law
does not burden the administration of these agencies, whether state laws are
varying or uniform. See supra notes 101-104 and accompanying text.
139. Kimbell, 440 U.S. at 728.
140. Id at 740.
141. See supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
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The reformulated Kimbell test is open to criticism because
it does not provide for adoption of a uniform federal rule even
if the federal interest, although not compelling, is greater than
the state interest.14 A rule requiring the balancing of federal
and state interests, however, gives little guidance, requires
courts to measure intangibles and make uncertain predictions,
and often leads courts to make subjective judgments about the
effectiveness of state schemes that state legislatures should
make in the absence of compelling federal interests.143
Leaving flexibility in the test will allow the courts to inter-
cede where a state law has, for all practical purposes, cut off
creditors' remedies. In such a case, support of those in need of
government financial assistance in one state would consume a
grossly disproportionate amount of government resources. Al-
ternatively, such a state law could cause a federal agency to dis-
continue its program in that state, contravening federal
objectives. The following examples should help define "sub-
stantial frustration."
The flexibility of the reformulated test is not intended to
allow a court to intervene because it disagrees with a rational
state policy. For example, in United States v. Haddon Hacien-
das Co.,' 44 the Ninth Circuit rejected adoption of a state anti-
deficiency statute because the Supreme Court of California had
interpreted the statute to bar mortgagee suits for waste.145 The
court found the state-law policy that suits for waste aggravate
economic downturns in the same fashion as deficiency judg-
ments146 conflicted with the general federal policy that suits for
142. See Comment, supra note 138, at 846 (criticizing proposal to adopt
state law in absence of "conflict" between state law and federal programs).
143. Mishkin described a spectrum with state law applying of its own force
on one end and state law that directly conflicts with federal law and is pre-
empted on the other. See Mishkin, supra note 3, at 805. The new formulation
merely recognizes that although state mortgage law potentially may conflict
with federal operations to such an extent that courts have held it is pre-
empted, courts should adopt state law that does not in fact obstruct federal
programs.
144. 541 F.2d 777 (9th Cir. 1976).
145. Id. at 783-85. See Cornelison v. Kornbluth, 15 Cal. 3d 590, 602-04, 125
Cal. Rptr. 557, 566-67, 542 P.2d 981, 990-91 (1975) (applying state statutory pro-
scription of deficiency judgment after any foreclosure sale to deny recovery in
actions for waste following foreclosure sale, except in instance of "bad faith"
waste).
146. The court in Haddon stated that the policy behind Cornelison was
"that downturns in land values often force owners to defer maintenance in or-
der to meet mortgage payments. To impose personal liability for waste result-
ing from such economic pressures would aggravate the downturn in the same
way that allowing deficiency judgments would." Haddon, 541 F.2d at 782.
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waste advance the prevention of slums.147 Haddon rejected
state law on the basis of a broad principle rather than because
of financial concerns.148 The reformulated test's heavy pre-
sumption in favor of state law will not prevent courts from
characterizing federal objectives so that they conflict with state
law, but the test does emphasize that the conflict should be real
and that state policies should be given great weight.
The reformulated rule arguably goes beyond Kimbell, but
it was the constrained and inconsistent language of the Kimbell
decision that generated inconsistent application of the test and
which makes necessary a more strongly and concisely worded
test. The interpretation embodied in the reformulation is simi-
lar to the First and Fifth Circuits' interpretation of Kimbell,149
is in accord with scholastic commentary on the subject,' 50 and is
147. Id. at 784.
148. The reformulated test is difficult to apply to conflicts between state
and federal policies based on principle rather than financial concerns. For in-
stance, in United States v. Med 0 Farm, Inc., 701 F.2d 88 (9th Cir. 1983), a case
involving an emergency FmHA loan, the court refused to adopt a Washington
state judicial policy voiding "due-on-sale" clauses. Such clauses cause an as-
signment of a mortgage to automatically accelerate the underlying loan. The
state policy viewed due-on-sale clauses as an unreasonable restraint on aliena-
tion if the transfer of the loan obligation would not increase the risk of de-
fault. The court held that the state policy conflicted with the FmHA policy
restricting the parties eligible for such emergency loans. Id. at 90. Allowing
eligible parties to sell their FmHA loans appears, from one perspective, to de-
feat the eligibility requirements. From another perspective, however, whether
the eligible party repays the FmHA loan which has favorable terms or sells
the favorable loan, it is still the eligible party who benefits from the federally
subsidized loan. Med 0 Farm presents a difficult scenario. The state policy in-
terferes with the manner in which federal benefits are conferred. The Wash-
ington state policy appears to aim at private lenders who use due-on-sale
clauses as leverage to take advantage of rising interest rates, rather than at
public lenders who seek to control the nature of their subsidy. Perhaps the
Court in Med 0 Farm should have held the judicial policy inapplicable as a
matter of state law rather than finding that the policy frustrated federal objec-
tives under the Kimbell test.
149. See supra notes 68-77 and accompanying text.
150. Commentary on Stadium rejected the outcome of that case and pro-
posed tests favoring adoption of state law by requiring a greater quantum of
conflict between federal operation and state law before state law could be re-
jected. See Note, 734 supra note 100, at (suggesting adoption of state law, but
rejecting state law aspects that inflict major damage on federal objectives);
Note, supra note 134, at 367 (finding federal interest in Stadium insufficient to
abrogate local interest); Note, Federal Housing Loans: Is State Mortgage Law
Preempted?, 19 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 431, 446 (1979) (stating that uniformity
and protection of federal fisc are given too much weight in balancing of inter-
ests); Note, Property Mortgages State Redemption Statutes Not Applicable to
Foreclosure by United States on FHA Insured Mortgage, 23 VAND. L. REV.
1384, 1389-90 (1970) (suggesting adoption of state law whenever significant lo-
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in harmony with past Supreme Court decisions.1 5 1
Application of the reformulated Kimbell test to redemption
and deficiency cases involving voluntary federal creditors
would prevent misapplication of the general principles es-
poused in Kimbell. Application of the new test would resolve
the split in authority in favor of the decisions adopting state
law in the redemption and deficiency areas, as well as in other
areas of mortgage law. The split in authority resulted from the
ease with which courts have overlooked the spirit of the Kim-
bell decision by applying only the black letter of the three-
pronged analysis.' 52 Adoption of the new test would create
greater uniformity in results and greater certainty as to the ap-
plicable rules of law in foreclosures by voluntary federal credi-
tors.153 The new test also embodies the traditional respect for
state authority in commercial and property matters and avoids
cal interests arise unless adoption created "irreconciliable conflict" with long-
range federal policy objectives); Note, Federal Courts Refusal to Apply State
Redemption Statute to FHA-Insured Mortgage Foreclosure, 17 WAYNE L. REv.
178, 188 (1971) (arguing that courts should not be overprotective of federal pro-
grams that already function under local law).
151. In United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966), the Court stated
that the judiciary should adopt state law in areas of traditionally local concern
unless adoption would cause "major damage" to federal interests. In United
States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 596 (1973), the Court sug-
gested that the judiciary could adopt state law as long as that law was not "ab-
errant" or "hostile" to federal interests.
152. The language of the Kimbell test leaves great room for judicial discre-
tion. Words like burden and frustrate, used in the Kimbell analysis, are words
of degree. The words should be given content with reference to other princi-
ples stated in Kimbell. In coming to its conclusion, the Kimbell Court noted
that the community should fund social welfare programs through taxes and
not by avoiding costs by changing the rules on private individuals. United
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 735 (1979). The Court also noted
that federal interests could be adequately protected by adoption of state law
that did not discriminate against federal interests. Id at 729 (state law that
mandates separate treatment for federal goverment cannot be adopted). Fi-
nally, the Court in Kimbell indicated that courts should respect state law until
Congress provides to the contrary. I& at 740.
As discussed above, many cases rejecting adoption of state law have failed
adequately to distinguish Kimbell, despite going through the motions of apply-
ing the suggested analysis. See supra notes 86-92 and accompanying text.
153. The adoption of uniform federal rules of decision engenders uncer-
tainty with reference to both the specific issue decided and to other areas of
law. Adoption by a district court of a uniform rule may not in fact create a
uniform rule until the Supreme Court decides the issue, as was evidenced in
the application of the uniform federal priority rule rejected in Kimbell, and as
is currently evidenced by the differing federal redemption and deficiency deci-
sions among the circuits. Adoption of a uniform federal rule also creates un-
certainty in similar areas of law that must be litigated to be resolved. See
Note, supra note 134, at 366-67 (arguing rejection of state law as federal rule
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substitution of judicial for legislative judgment.'1  At the same
time, the test would assure that specific federal objectives are
attained.155
The proposed test strongly favors adoption of state law as
the federal rule of decision. The test is likely to bar only appli-
cation of novel state laws, because the federal agencies have, as
have private lenders, already demonstrated their ability to op-
erate responsibly under current state law.15 6 Should an eco-
nomic downturn strain the resources of federal agencies or
produce strong pro-debtor legislation, the proposed rule favors
state remedies until Congress acts.157 As the above analysis
suggests, a Supreme Court case applying the proposed test
would overrule the decisions rejecting adoption of state re-
demption rights: Stadium and its progeny. 55
CONCLUSION
Historically, in foreclosures by voluntary federal creditors,
courts adopted only those state mortgage laws and procedures
that the courts believed would forward federal policy and re-
fused to adopt state law that limited the remedies of the federal
creditors. Thus, federal creditors received the benefit of state
procedures without the burden of the debtor protections incor-
porated into state mortgage schemes. The Supreme Court in
Kimbell promulgated a three-pronged test ostensibly directing
the courts to adopt state law unless such adoption would ob-
struct specific objectives of the federal programs. First and
Fifth Circuit decisions interpreted Kimbell to place voluntary
confuses mortgage law by posing two laws on same subject and raising doubts
about applicability of other state rules).
154. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
155. The test is less stringent than a rule adopting nondiscriminatory state
law unless Congress has specifically preempted state law in the area. Adop-
tion of the proposed test will result in outcomes similar to Sherred, where the
court found that the FHA and related entities could find a way to cope with
adoption of state mechanic's lien laws; and, if not, Congress or HUD could pre-
empt the rule by specific legislation or regulation. See Chicago Title Ins. Co. v.
Sherred Village Assocs., 708 F.2d 804, 812-13 (1st Cir. 1983).
156. See supra notes 115, 118.
157. The theory behind the preference is that the community as a whole
should pay for social welfare programs rather than homeowners, farmers,
small businesses, and developers whose rights would be affected if a uniform
federal rule were adopted rather than state law. United States v. Kimbell
Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 735 (1979).
158. Stadium involved a multifamily mortgage that may now be foreclosed
under the MIFA. See supra note 4. There would be no redemption rights
and no deficiency. See supra note 118.
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federal creditors on a par with private lenders and adopted
state law if adoption did not obstruct the effective operation of
federal programs. Sixth, eighth, and Ninth Circuit decisions,
however, either ignored or misapplied the Kimbell test and re-
jected adoption of state law in favor of abstract uniformity ar-
guments and the perceived need to protect the federal treasury
by assuring federal creditors against loss. Contradictory ele-
ments of the Kimbell test and the lack of integrated analysis in
the Kimbell decision are, in part, responsible for the inconsis-
tent interpretations of the decision. Reformulation of the
three-pronged test into one rule mandating that courts adopt
state law unless adoption would substantially reduce a federal
agency's ability to serve its social welfare objectives would re-
solve the conflict of authority in favor of the First and Fifth
Circuit interpretations and would leave less room for inconsis-
tent results. The rule favors the determinations of state legisla-
tures until Congress acts explicitly to displace state law.
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